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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-AID TO PAROCHIAL
SCHOOLS AND THE ENTANGLEMENT OF CHURCH AND
STATE-Aguilar v. Felton-Although the Court in Aguilar v.
Felton' acknowledged that the education program in question
had "done so much good and little, if any, detectable harm,"'
the majority nonetheless struck down the program because of its
potential for entangling church and state.3 Under the program,
teachers employed by the New York City Board 'of Education
and paid with federal funds were sent into private religious
schools to tutor." Only students needing remedial work and liv-
ing in economically deprived areas were eligible for the pro-
gram.5 The publicly paid teachers participating in the program
were warned not to use religious ideas in their lessons, or to be-
come involved in the religious activities of the school.6 Regula-
tions forbade any tutoring sessions from being held in any class-
room containing religious symbols, and provided for inspections
by supervisors to control teachers' conduct.7 Despite these pre-
cautions, the Court held that public employees teaching on reli-
gious premises constituted excessive entanglement.8 The legisla-
tive benefit, in effect, was invalidated merely because of the site
at which administrators chose to provide it.'
The Court has balanced freedom of conscience against edu-
cational development using its own maxims of interpretation
whether or not those maxims corresponded to the facts. 0 Al-
1. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
2. Id. at 3239 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Felton v. Secretary of Educ., 739 F.2d
48, 72 (2d Cir. 1985)). Also quoted in 105 S. Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238-39.
4. Id. at 3235.
5. Id. at 3234.
6. Id. at 3235.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3238.
9. Id. The majority opinion implies consequences of the program upon which it also
seeks to rely, but those implications arise solely from the location of the program. Id. at
3238-39.
10. For balancing, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14-7 (1978). For
maxims, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1971), that parochial schools are
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though the Court has at times allowed government to recognize
the social contributions of religious institutions," in Aguilar, the
Court returned to applying mechanical principles justifying it-
self by asserting that it was defending absolute rights.' 2 Denying
educational aid to those who need it most, through an extensive
search for potential constitutional violations, however, can
hardly be supported by constitutional mandate. 3
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause"1 and the free exercise clause' 5
comprise the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. Co-
lonial concerns with voluntarism, separatism, and federalism de-
termined the final phrasing of the clauses,' 6 but in construing
them, the Court generally relies on separatism.'" The legislative
intent behind the first amendment can be articulated as separa-
tism in three different contexts and for three different purposes:
to keep religion safe from civil authorities, as espoused by Roger
Williams; to keep civil society safe from religious authorities, as
espoused by Thomas Jefferson; and to fractionalize society to
"pervasively sectarian;" id. at 616-19, that religious and secular education are insepara-
ble in nonpublic schools; id. at 618, that teachers cannot be effectively supervised,
whether public or private employees; Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1980),
that neutrality to religion forbids even the appearance of joint authority between church
and state; and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), that religious education is a
religious activity.
11. See generally Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Walz v. Tax Commisssion,
397 U.S. 664 (1969).
12. See the Lemon test, infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 19-57 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion... "
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I, ... or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
16. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall - A
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 773. Voluntarism denotes tolera-
tion of all sects and no compulsion to support any sect, as the Quakers allowed in Penn-
sylvania. Separatism meant no governmental support of religious institutions, as in Vir-
ginia. The federalism component represented the political compromise of the diverse
states with their diverse relations with religion; none of the established sects could be
established as the national religion, but neither could the national government disestab-
lish any state churches. See also M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS, 19-23
(1968).
17. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at § 14-2.
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prevent mob rule, as espoused by James Madison."8 However
useful the idea of separation is, and whatever the goal of the
separatists, one must keep in mind that separation is not man-
dated by the words of the Constitution, 9 nor completely possi-
ble in a complex society.20 Where the two clauses conflict, the
Court uses the policy of separation to balance the countervailing
clauses, and gives the free exercise clause precedence as the
more absolute of the prohibitions.2
Establishment denotes official support for a church by civil
authorities.2 Support may consist of providing revenues through
18. Id. at § 14-3. As Justice Rehnquist points oui in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at
2509, "Thomas Jefferson was of course in France" when the first amendment was writ-
ten. Roger Williams was presumably in Providence, so James Madison is accordingly
revealed as the true progenitor. Madison's approach, however, is based in political theory
which may not be judicially cognizable.
19. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J.,
dissenting). "A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."
20. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1969). "No perfect or absolute
separation is really possible."
21. See L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at § 14-7. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2488 (1985) where the "underlying principle" of non-establishment was described
as "individual freedom of conscience" which would make the establishment clause an
aspect of free exercise, adding nothing to the scope of the protection.
A different perspective on separation of church and state can be obtained from other
countries.
The original Soviet Constitution of 1918 permitted "freedom of religious
and antireligious propaganda." If this reflected a certainty that the antireligious
would prevail, the confidence soon ebbed, and the passage was amended in 1929
to "freedom of religious worship and antireligious propaganda." Thus deprived
of its right to make "propaganda," the church lost its ability to transmit its
creed and values formally: no group study, no Sunday schools, no evangelism.
The party, meanwhile, was free, even obligated, to preach atheism. The Consti-
tution adopted under Stalin in 1936 contained Article 124 on state-church rela-
tions, the provisions of which were retained in the revised Constitution of 1978,
Article 52, guaranteeing citizens' "freedom of conscience," by declaring that "the
church in the U.S.S.R. is separate from the state, and the school from the
church." To an American ear attuned to the values of separation of church and
state, this may sound surprisingly liberal. But in a society where the state is all-
embracing, it means there is little room left for the church.
D. SHIPLER, RUSSIA: BROKEN IDOLS, SOLEMN DREAMS, 271-72 (1983). See also Katcoff v.
Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding the military providing chaplains where
necessary for religious exercises of personnel, but remanding to determine whether such
chaplains are necessary in domestic urban areas).
22. Established church is defined as "a church recognized by law as the official
church of a nation and supported by civil authority, and that receives in most instances
financial support from the government through some system of taxation." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 778 (1981).
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taxation, enforcing weekly attendance requirements, or even
persecuting apostates. 3 The Supreme Court has given a broad
meaning to the establishment clause, construing it to forbid any
fostering or supporting of religion in any form.2 4 Potential viola-
tions are sufficient to estop governmental actions.25 Even psy-
chological linkage of church and state may violate the establish-
ment clause. 2' The Court, however, has failed to explain how
education can exclude exposure to religion and remain neutral
between religion and non-religion. Similarly, an observer could
perceive separation as disfavor and disdain, in the same way
23. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1947) (quoting Virginia Bill for Reli-
gious Liberty). "That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief." 330 U.S. at 13.
24. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one reli-
gion over another. Neither can force or influence a person against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be pun-
ished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church at-
tendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor a Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall
of separation between church and State."
See also id. at 31 (Rutledge, J., dissenting),
Not simply an established church, but any law respecting an establishment
of religion is forbidden. The Amendment was broadly but not loosely phrased. It
is the compact and exact summation of its author's views formed during his long
struggle for religious freedom . . . .Madison could not have confused "church"
and "religion," or "an established church" and "an establishment of religion."
This assumes that Madison had objective control over the legislative process that
produced the amendment, because the final version was not Madison's original draft.
The use of "respecting" may indicate mere positive and negative, and not the broader
meaning ascribed by the Court. The use of "religion" may be atributed to the need for
the word to act as the antecedent of "thereof" in the free exercise clause. Close scrutiny
of the language proves too much. The Court should express its policy and expose itself.
See M. HOWE, supra note 16, at 19-23 (1968).
25. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
26. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
27. Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L.
REV. 127, 166-72 (1985).
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that the Court has perceived involvement as favoritism. 8
B. The Doctrine of Entanglement
Because the Court has depended on the metaphor of separa-
tion of church and state, it forbids excessive contact among the
separate hierarchies. Whether any actual establishing, fostering,
or suporting occurs, any potentiality is characterized as entan-
glement.29 Limited or routine contact is not forbidden, and a
one-time grant may be distinguished from a continuing series of
grants." An exemption from property taxes, while beneficial to a
religious institution, can be justified by the reduction of contact
between the competing bureaucracies of government and
religion.3'
Entanglement is the involvement in religion by government.
Three types of entanglement have been identified.32 Doctrinal
entanglement arises when civil authorities decide questions of
religious doctrine. An intra-congregational dispute about control
over the congregation's property, for example may be deter-
mined according to which faction is found to be orthodox. 3 Ad-
ministrative entanglement involves a relationship requiring
monitoring or surveillance of a religious institution, especially in
connection with religious activities.3 4 Political divisiveness in-
28. The ridiculousness of this logical converse to the Court's tests shows how far the
Court is reaching to formulate tests which support its policies. If the aim of separation is
secularization of society as proposed by Jefferson, see supra note 18, then announce that
policy explicitly, and explore how secularization impacts on society and the rights of
individuals, and we all may learn something. See also M. HowE, supra note 16.
29. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-75, and Lemon 403 U.S. at 619-20.
30. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971), Lemon, 403 U.S. at 669
(White, J., dissenting). See also Note, Political Entanglement as an Independent Test
of Constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1209, 1225
(1980); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
31. Walz, 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
32. Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury after Taxation with Representa-
tion of Washington, Mueller, and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275. See also Abingdon
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). "Equally
the Constitution enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions which
(a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs
of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to
serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice."
33. Schachner, supra note 32, at 277-78.
34. Id. at 276-77.
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volves inflammatory political conflict across sectarian lines."
Different types of entanglement produce different concerns.
In the first case to hold a program unconstitutional because of
entanglement, Chief Justice Burger discussed the different im-
plications of entanglement. "As well as constituting an indepen-
dent evil against which the Religion Clauses were intended to
protect, involvement or entanglement between government and
religion serves as a warning signal.""6 The "independent evil" is
doctrinal entanglement which arises when the state decides
questions of religious doctrine.37 The "warning signals" are ad-
ministrative entanglement and political divisiveness, which do
not involve governmental support for religion.38 The working re-
lationship between government and church involves potential
decisions about what is secular or religious, what is permissible
or not. 9 Inherent in the process of government spending is the
promise of increased or decreased funding for the successful or
unsuccessful contractor or delegatee. When govenment funding
flows through religious institutions, the religious institutions
must safeguard the secular nature of that funding in order that
the funding continue. Where funding may not only continue but
increase, a subtle pressure to secularize arises.4 ° In the same
manner, political division along sectarian lines may indicate that
a majority has been created to provide benefits for religious in-
stitutions.4 ' The Court looks beneath the surface of decision-
making, to potential, future decisions, and to the motivations
behind past decisions. 2
35. Id. at 277.
36. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624-25.
37. Where the state favors a group because of its particular doctrinal views, its action
has the primary effect of advancing the views of that group. In its blatant form, entan-
glement, the third prong of the Lemon test, see infra notes 84-95 and accompanying
text, is thus equivalent to primary effect, the second prong.
38. The potential for entanglement of these two types is sufficient to attract the
Court's attention. The Court, however, does not explore the entangled relationship once
detected, but quarantines the parties.
39. Id. at 619-20.
40. Id. at 622-24.
41. Id. at 624-25.
42. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
The task of deciding when the Establishment Clause is implicated in the
context of parochial school aid has proved to be a delicate one for the Court.
Usually it requires a careful evaluation of the facts of the particular case . . ..
It would be wholly inappropriate for us to render an opinion on the First
[Vol. IV
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By depending on the metaphor of separation of church and
state, rather than the actual text of the Constitution that man-
dates non-establishlishment, the Court reaches unsupportable
results such as the doctrine of non-entanglement. One influential
commentator"3 demanded "mutual abstention of the political
and religious caretakers.""' The Constitution does not block the
input to governmental apparatus from religious persons, but
prevents religious persons from acquiring for their religious in-
stitutions governmental benefits.4 5 Prevention of political divi-
siveness may have been the intention of the establishment
clause, specifically, and the Constitution, generally, but that in-
tention is not specifically incarnated in any specific mechanism
of the Constitution."' To elevate the Court's admonitions against
political division to a legal test under the establishment clause
would misconstrue the intent of the Framers to create a limited
government as an intent to limit the power of religion.,7 People
are free to act politically, regardless of religious motivation or
affiliation, as long as by their actions they do not produce a gov-
ernmental action which violates the Constitution."8
Amendment issue when no specific plan is before us. A federal court does not sit
to attempt to render a decision on hypothetical facts ....
Id. at 426-27.
43. Paul Freund's article, see infra note 44, published in 1969 was a major part of the
outcry following the Allen decision, see infra note 57, which lead to the substantial shift
in the Court's decision in Lemon, see infra note 84, according to Schotten, The Estab-
lishment Clause and Excessive Governmental- Religious Entanglement: The Constitu-
tional Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 15 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 207, 223 (1979).
44. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L REV. 1680, 1684 (1969). See
also supra note 24.
45. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 6
(1984).
46. Note, Political Entanglement as an Independent Test of Constitutionality
Under the Establishment Clause, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1209 (1984).
47. See L. TRIBE § 1-2, for the various theories behind creating a limited government.
48. Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the
Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980). See also
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating a Tennessee constitutional provision
which prohibited ministers from holding public office).
The antidote which the Constitution provides against zealots who would in-
ject sectarianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to refutation
in the marketplace of ideas and their platforms to rejection at the polls. With
these safeguards, it is unlikely that they will succeed in inducing government to
act along religiously divisive lines, and, with judicial enforcement of the estab-
lishment clause, any measure of success they achieve must be short-lived, at
1986]
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C. Early Aid to Parochial Schools Cases
The two landmark cases which allow aid to parochial
schools under the establishment clause4 9 are Everson v. Board of
Educ.50 and Allen v. Board of Educ 1 In Everson, the Court
held that the "wall of separation between church and State" 2
would not be breached by reimbursing parents for the expense
of bus fares paid to send their children to religious schools."
The program provided a general benefit of free transportation
without differentiating between believers and nonbelievers. 4
The benefit flowed to parents, and only indirectly to religious
institutions." The dissenters viewed the benefit as flowing only
best.
Id. at 642 (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. Before Everson, the Court denied the establishment clause was implicated in the
disbursement of funds for a Catholic school on an Indian reservation, because the funds
belonged to the Indians and were only held in trust by the government. Quick Bear v.
Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). Other cases involving private education were decided under
the due process clause. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the state could not
forbid the teaching of the German language because parental choice in education is a
fundamental liberty interest. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the
state could not limit parental choice in education to public schools, because such choice
is a fundamental liberty protected by substantive due process. Property interests of pri-
vate schools (a military academy as well as a religious school) were also protected in
Pierce. Textbook loans to private school pupils serve a public purpose, education, and
thus do not constitute a governmental taking for a private purpose. Cochran v. Louisiana
State Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
The establishment clause is regarded as incorporated by Everson in the liberty guar-
antee of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, although dicta in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), incorporated it there along with the free exercise
clause. Everson held that the establishment clause was not implicated, so that the first
case holding the establishment clause was violated is McCollum, see supra note 19.
This slipshod incorporation has not gone unnoticed, especially in light of the influ-
ence of federalism on the establishment clause, see supra note 16. Justice Brennan in
Abingdon 374 U.S. at 255, reasoned that the Framers of the fourteenth amendment re-
lied on the disestablishment of state churches by 1833 in forming their notion of liberty.
The abortive Blaine Amendment, to apply the establishment clause to the states, was
unnecessary, because state constitutions and the fourteenth amendment were already a'
sufficient barrier.
Justice Rehnquist, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2508 (1985), also re-exam-
ines the constitutional history, arguing that religion was preferred over nonreligion, even
if one sect could not be preferred over another.
50. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
51. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
52. 330 U.S. at 16.




to those attending religious schools, although public school stu-
dents were already receiving free transportation. 6
In Allen, the Court upheld the validity of textbook loans to
parochial school students.57 Rejecting the argument that any aid
to a religious school benefits religion, 58 the Court allowed the
textbook loans, because textbooks have specific, determinable
contents.5 Local school board officials had to approve textbooks
before the state could provide them to religious schools.6 0 Such
public officials cannot be assumed to disregard their official du-
ties by approving texts with religious themes and points-of-view
merely because administrators of religious schools request
them."1
D. Other Early Cases
As the Court developed its method of analysis between 1947
and 1971, the establishment clause was applied to school situa-
tions other than aid to parochial schools ."
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,3 a released-
time program was challenged for violating the establishment
clause." In order to relax the state's monopoly over prime learn-
ing time created by compulsory attendance laws, the public
school releases some of the student's time to the student, so that '
the student can seek religious instruction that the state may not
provide but that the student's parents desire. 5 The Illinois pro-
gram required parents to request a religious class and a particu-
56. Id. at 20, and at 3 n.1.
57. 392 U.S. 236, 248.
58. Id. But see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. Allen, 392 U.S. at 244. See also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
60. Allen, 392 U.S. at 245.
61. Id. "Absent evidence, we cannot assume that school authorities, who constantly
face the same problem in selecting textbooks for use in public schools, are unable to
distinguish between secular and religious books or that they will not honestly discharge
their duties under law."
Such officials act in the public eye and are readily amenable to suit, with the books
constituting immutable evidence of their actions. That is, the school boards are account-
able to the courts.
62. That is between the first establishment clause case, Everson, and the develop-
ment of a highly structured test in Lemon, see infra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
63. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 222 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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lar denomination before the student could be required to attend
a religion class.6 The classes were held in public school build-
ings. 67 School officials had some discretion in choosing whether
to allow religious teachers to hold classes. 8 The Court held the
program unconstitutional because the location of the classes,
and the possible discrimination among sects involved public
school officials with religious issues and the possibility of sup-
porting religion.6 9
Four years later, in Zorach v. Clauson,7 the Court upheld a
New York released-time program, and refused to recognize the
existence of issues under the free exercise71 and establishment
clauses.7 Under this program, students left the public school to
attend classes at a nearby parochial school. The Court appar-
ently distinguished McCollum on the basis of the shift in loca-
tion.7 3 The released-time program still involved enforcement of
compulsory attendance laws for a religion class, and presumably
some screening of teachers or institutions for the safety of the
students, yet, this released-time program was upheld by the
Court.74
Other cases involved efforts to remove prayer from public
schools. In Abingdon School Dist. v. Schempp,7 6 the Court ruled
that the state could not sponsor Bible readings and prayer recit-
als.7 6 Although the children could choose to absent themselves
during the readings, the authoritarian setting, as well as peer
pressure, would inhibit the exercise of that right.7 Sponsoring
prayers, even with a secular purpose, has the effect of promoting
religion.78 Similarly, an effort to introduce religious values into
66. Id. at 209.
67. Id. at 205, 209.
68. Id. at 208.
69. Id. at 209.
70. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
71. Id. at 311.
72. Id. at 311-12.
73. Id. at 308-09.
74. The Court's change of heart may be due to political furor rather than factual
distinction. See Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. UL.
REV. 1, 8 (1984).
75. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
76. Id. at 205-12.
77. Id. at 225-26, 208 n.3.
78. Id. at 222-25.
[Vol. IV
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science classes was invalidated.7
Outside the school context, the Court validated Sunday
Closing laws which were originally intended to enforce a day of
rest by limiting commercial activity. The Court held that over a
period of time such laws had lost their original religious intent,
and were presently justified by a secular purpose." Similarly, in
Walz v. Tax Commission,81 tax exemptions for properties of reli-
gious institutions were upheld, because of the non-religious con-
tributions of such institutions to society,82 and the distance cre-
ated between institutions by exemptions as compared to the
institutional involvement entailed in taxation of such property.8 3
E. The Lemon Test and Current Interpretation
In 1971, the Court promulgated a three-pronged test for the
establishment clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman.8 4 The Court took
the first two prongs from Abingdon,85 and the third prong from
either an Abingdon concurrence,86 or Walz. 87 The test required
that "first, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute must not
79. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (state law barring teaching of
evolution in public schools was unconstitutional because it did not have a secular legisla-
tive purpose). See also Edwards v. Aguillard, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 778
F.2d 225 (en banc), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1946 (1986) (statute requiring balanced
treatment of creation-science and evolution-science held unconstitutional); Daniel v. Wa-
ters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975) (statute violated Establishment Clause by requiring
equal time for Genesis when evolution is taught). But cf. "There is no reason ... why a
state is without power to withdraw from its curriculum any subject deemed too emo-
tional and controversial for its public schools." 397 U.S. at 113 (Black, J., concurring);
Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (state had
power to remove the topic of birth control from public school curricula without violating
Establishment Clause or teacher's free speech right). See generally Note, Freedom of
Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515 (1978).
80. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
81. 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
82. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 674-76. Valuation would be the true root of entanglement if exemptions
were denied. Variations in assessments could result from a policy of favoring property of
one sect over another, or property of religious organizations over other property. In addi-
tion, increased concern over finances could lead to the secularization of many sermons.
84. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
85. 374 U.S. 203, 222.
86. 374 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also supra note 32.
87. 397 U.S. 664, 674.
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foster 'an excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.' "88
Regarding aid to parochial schools, the secular legislative
purpose has generally been accepted at face value: aiding educa-
tion generally, rather than aiding religious education particu-
larly. 9 The burden of proving the other two prongs of the
Lemon test negative has been imposed on the government to
make certain that the government is not aiding religion.°
The Lemon case barred reimbursement to religious schools
for salaries of teachers of secular subjects, such as mathematics
or science. 1 In order to prevent the inculcation of religion, a reg-
ulatory system accompanied the aid, resulting in a "comprehen-
sive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" 92 of the
religious schools.9 The Chief Justice noted the possibility of po-
litical debate dividing along sectarian lines, and intensifying
over annual appropriations. 4 Since the relationship would be-
come increasingly entangled and virulent, the initial entangle-
ment must be taken as a "warning signal." 95
The Court, in the companion case of Tilton v. Richardson,9"
distinguished aid to an institution of higher education from aid
to an elementary or secondary school. By characterizing elemen-
tary and secondary schools as "pervasively sectarian, ' 97 the
Court distinguished higher education as not including "religious
indoctrination as a substantial purpose oractivity." e
The Court used its new test to construe the establishment
clause strictly, preventing most aid to religious institutions. In
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty,99 the
Court considered a New York program which reimbursed non-
88. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
89. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3223, "[als has often been true
in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test."
90. Felton, 739 F.2d at 65-66.
91. 403 U.S. at 607 (supplementing income in Rhode Island program), and at 610
(reimbursing salaries in Pennsylvania).
92. Id. at 619.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 622.
95. Id. at 624-25. See also supra text accompanying note 36.
96. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
97. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
98. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
99. 413 U.S. 472 (1972).
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public schools for services mandated by state law including rec-
ord-keeping and testing. 00 Testing was found to be an integral
part of the teaching process.' 0' The state cannot be certain that
payments to religious school teachers will not have the effect of
advancing religion. 102 On the same day, in Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 03 two other New York
programs, one granting cash subsidies to nonpublic schools in
low income areas for maintenance and repair of facilities,' and
another providing for tuition reimbursement, 0 were also invali-
dated. 06 Neither program "was sufficiently restricted to assure
that it would not have the impermissible effect of advancing the
sectarian activities of religious schools.' 0 7 In Meek v. Pit-
tenger,0 8 the Court reviewed a Pennsylvania statute apparently
designed to provide the broadest benefits possible to nonpublic
school students without violating establishment clause princi-
ples. 09 The statute provided loans of not only textbooks," 0 but
also other non-religious instructional materials."' Such instruc-
tional materials were found to be too susceptible to religious
uses." 2 Some members of the Court would have gone further,
'reversing Allen, and disallowed the textbook loans as susceptible
to religious uses." 3 Auxiliary services, such as guidance, testing,
and therapeutic services, were found to create the same entan-
glement as a teaching relationship."" The Court was divided
100. Id. at 474-75.
101. Id. at 481.
102. Id. at 480.
103. 413 U.S. 756 (1972). See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1972) (upholding
aid to a nonpublic college under Tilton).
104. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762-64.
105. Id. at 764.
106. Id. at 798.
107. Id. at 794.
108. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
109. Id.
110. See Allen, supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
111. 421 U.S. at 362-66 (including projectors, recorders, films, recordings, maps,
charts, and laboratory equipment).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting), "it is pure fantasy to treat
the textbook program as a loan to students." See Allen, supra notes 57-61 and accompa-
nying text. Allen's precedential value could have been expanded to include instructional
material, or contracted to exclude it. In any event, it seems the Court decided on the new
facts and then returned to Allen to decide whether it was expanded or contracted.
114. 421 U.S. at 369-70.
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into three factions of three justices each. The moderate faction
was able to create a plurality decision by depending on votes
from both extremes on different points." 5
Two years later, with an almost identical alignment in an-
other plurality decision, Wolman v. Walter,"6 the Court took a
more accomodationist approach to aid to parochial schools
under an Ohio statute. Diagnostic services" 7 were found not to
involve a continuing relationship between church and state, and
were thus permissible."' Therapeutic, guidance, and remedial
services" 9 could be provided, but only on neutral sites off non-
public school premises.' 0 Equipment and material loans, and
provision of bus transportation for field trips were not permissi-
ble,' 2' because they put state resources under the control of non-
public school teachers.' 2
The Court's willingness to accomodate aid to parochial
schools continued in Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan.' After Levitt,'2' the New York legislature
passed a new statute to reimburse nonpublic schools for the
costs of complying with state requirements. The statute only
covered activities not part of the teaching process. 2 5 For exam-
ple, teachers could be paid only for marking state-mandated,
standardized tests.12 Such tests are not part of the on-going,
115. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall would have restricted aid. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, and Justices White, and Rehnquist would have allowed broader aid. Justices
Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell were the moderate faction. Id. at 350
116. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Justice Douglas was replaced by Justice Stevens, who voted
with the same group, and Chief Justice Burger voted with the moderate faction. This
minor difference demonstrates how the Court remained sharply divided, but moved ever
so slightly in the direction of less restriction on aid.
117. Id. at 241-44. That is, services to diagnose speech, hearing, and psychological
problems.
118. Id.
119. Such aid would involve a continuing relationship through repeated sessions. Id.
120. Id. at 244-48.
121. Id. at 248-55, but see id. at 264 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting, who
would find that bus service was a permissible form of aid under Everson, see supra notes
52-56 and accompanying text).
122. These forms of aid were capable of diversion to sectarian purposes. 433 U.S. at
249, 254.
123. 444 U.S. 646 (1980). Edward Regan replaced Arthur Levitt as Comptroller of
New York State, and as PEARL's target.
124. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
125. Regan, 444 U.S. at 656.
126. Id. at 657-59.
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personal evaluation a teacher must make to teach appropriate
material to his class. In addition, state audits would prevent ex-
cessive or misdirected reimbursements.1 1 7
Mueller v. Allen " ' demonstrated an even more marked
swing away from the position that "any aid" was too much. " A
Minnesota statute allowed a tax deduction for tuition, text-
books, and transportation for parents with children in elemen-
tary and secondary schools."' 0 Although the lion's share of the
benefit would flow to parents of nonpublic school students, the
statute was neutral on its face, because public school students
could incur qualifying expenses for extracurricular activities.131
The Court distinguished between providing instructional materi-
als to be used by the students, which would benefit the individu-
als, and direct loans of instructional materials to nonpublic
schools, which would benefit the institutions. 32
In an even more accomodationist vein, the Court declined to
apply the Lemon test in two recent cases. 33 Marsh v. Cham-
bers134 upheld the constitutionality of legislative chaplains be-
cause of the existence of such chaplains at the time of the draft-
ing and ratification of the first amendment, and the acceptance
of such chaplains throughout history.13 5 Lynch v. Donnelly'36
upheld a municipal Christmas display as merely engendering
community and seasonal spirit and goodwill, instead of estab-
127. Id. at 659-61.
128. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
129. Id. at 396 n.5. "[lit may be that religious institutions benefit very substantially
from allowance of such deductions. The Court's holding in [Walz], indicates, however,
that this does not require the conclusion that such provisions of a State's tax law violate
the Establishment Clause." Id. (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 390 n.1.
131. Id. at 398-99.
132. Id. at 402 n.10.
133. See supra notes 116-132.
134. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Legislative chaplains open sessions with prayers and coun-
sel legislators and staff who request such services.
135. Id. at 789-90.
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of
constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply historical pat-
terns. in this context, historical evidence sheds light not only on what the drafts-
men intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought
that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress- their ac-
tions reveal their intent.
Id. at 790.




F. Title I: Statutory Background of Aguilar v. Felton
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965138 provides federal funds to increase the educational oppor-
tunities of children who are educationally and economically de-
prived.139 Title I funds are intended to supplement, not sup-
plant, otherwise available programs and services, so that
educational benefits are improved, rather than maintained at
the same, inadequate level." 0 Under Title I, programs are pro-
posed by local educational agencies, and must be approved by
state educational agencies before federal funds are disbursed.""
In Wheeler v. Barrera,"s the Court decided that Title I funds
must be allotted to provide comparable benefits for all deprived
children, regardless of whether they attend public or nonpublic
schools."" The use of private school facilities under Title I was
upheld in Nebraska State Board of Educ. v. School Dist. of
Hartington,"" but apparently only because no public facilities
were available." 5
New York City attempted to comply with the statute by
providing assistance to deprived children without regard to what
school they attended."" Originally, nonpublic school students
were brought to public schools after regular school hours.14 7 Lag-
ging attendance and safety concerns, however, led the city to
send public school teachers to nonpublic schools during regular
137. Id. at 685.
138. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801-3876
(West Supp. 1986)).
139. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3801, 3804(c), 3805(d), 3806 (West Supp. 1986).
140. 20 U.S.C.A. § 3807(b) (West Supp. 1986).
141. 20 U.S.C.A. § 3805(a) (West Supp. 1986).
142. 417 U.S. 402 (1974). See also 20 U.S.C.A. § 3862 (West Supp. 1986).
143. 417 U.S. 402. Parents of nonpublic school students had sued to force state offi-
cials to provide Title I programs for their children.
144. Nebraska State Board of Educ. v. School Dist. of Hartington, 188 Neb. 1, 195
N.W.2d 161 (1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921 (1972).
145. 409 U.S. at 925. Justice Brennan, agreeing with the denial of certiorari, would
have affirmed this leasing of classrooms because there were no other available facilities
and both public and nonpublic school students would have attended the classes. Justice
Brennan filed this opinion to answer the dissent from denial of certiorari by Justice
Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall.
146. See supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
147. 739 F.2d at 51.
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school hours.'4 8 To prevent any identification of the classes with
religion or any fostering of religion by the public school teachers,
public school administrators promulgated regulations regarding
the content and decoration of classrooms in the parochial
schools, and inspection and evaluation of publicly paid teachers
working in those schools.' 9
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF Aguilar v. Felton
A. The District Court
In the eastern district of New York, basing their standing to
sue on their status as taxpayers,150 the plaintiffs in Aguilar v.
Felton sought an injunction against the distribution of federal
funds under Title I"' for sending New York City public school
teachers into private schools to provide remedial classes.' Since
a similar suit had been fiied in the southern district against the
same defendants and based on the same subject matter, Judge
Neaher of the eastern district stayed his decision pending the
final determination of that case."'
The case in the southern district, National Committee for
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Taxpayers have standing to challenge infringements of fundamental rights
under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Apparently, some of the original parties in
Flast initiated this suit also, see Nat'l Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Califano, 446 F. Supp. 193, 195 (1978). Under Flast, a specific limitation on governmen-
tal power which is related to the parties' status as taxpayers is sufficient to create stand-
ing to challenge the governmental action. The only such limitation recognized is the es-
tablishment clause. See McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of
Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1981),
which suggests the Court could have based standing on taxpayer status, rather than ra-
cial group membership for civil rights violations. The Court employs Flast standing to
defend fundamental liberty rights, not to defend taxpayer property, see L. TRIBE supra
note 10, at § 14-12 ("to recognize in the religion clauses a fundamental personal right not
to be part of a community whose official organs endorse religious views fundamentally
inimical to one's deepest beliefs."), and not to create a right to air "generalized griev-
ances about the conduct of government," see Flast, 392 U.S. at 106.
Now that the underlying controversy in Flast has been determined using a test de-
veloped subsequent to Flast, the time may be ripe to reconsider whether the establish-
ment clause is an absolute prohibition that can justify taxpayer standing.
151. See infra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
153. Felton, 739 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1984). Parents of nonpublic school students were
allowed to intervene as defendants to protect their children's interests. Id.
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Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris, ("PEARL"),
was heard by a three-judge court. 5" In 1978, the court denied
the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, because their delay in
pursuing their legal battle, originally begun in 1966, indicated
they would not suffer irreparable harm. 155 The court also denied
surpmary judgment to the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs them-
selves had, by their specific challenge to New York City's imple-
mentation of the statute through providing educational services
within religious schools during school hours, raised issues of fact;
although plaintiffs claimed they were challenging the constitu-
tionality of the entire statute, their specific complaint could not
support that contention. 56
The bulk of the evidence in PEARL was presented in affida-
vits and documents.15 7 The three-judge court upheld the pro-
gram under the three-pronged Lemon test.' 58 Although the pro-
gram was being implemented in religious schools, its purpose
was secular, to assist education generally.1 59 Instead of benefiting
religious institutions, the program had the primary effect of aid-
ing students by supplementing regular programs in order to
achieve a minimum level of education.' 60 The court found no ex-
cessive entanglement, because the schools were not pervasively
sectarian. It found that the regulations prevented misuse of the
funds, and that the working relationships between public and
154. 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (three-judge court) appeal dismissed, 449
U.S. 808.
155. Nat'l Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Califano, 446 F. Supp.
193 (1978).
156. Id. at 196. Having failed to prevent the passage of this statute in Congress,
whether or not its potential consequences were understood, plaintiffs sought to have the
courts repeal it.
157. PEARL, 489 F. Supp. 1252. Plaintiffs could not afford to finance a trial and
present evidence attacking the program. They preferred to challenge the interpretation
of the program which allowed the program. The City presented affidavits from various
officials and a few witnesses. See Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and Religion: Histori-
cal Overview and Future Prognosis, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 183, 197 (1978), suggesting that
public officials are not committed defenders of aid to parochial schools. A different trial
strategy and a different burden of proof could have left the plaintiffs buried under a ton
of paper.
158. PEARL, 489 F. Supp. at 1257. For the Lemon test see supra notes 84-95 and
accompanying text.
159. PEARL, 489 F. Supp. at 1257.
160. Id. at 1258-62.
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parochial school personnel were limited and routine. 161 Where
public school supervisory personnel evaluated the performance
and detachment of teachers sent to parochial schools, the plain-
tiffs charged the supervisors with "intrusionary investigatory en-
trances into the religious schools."'0 2 The court disagreed, find-
ing "[t]he supervisors have only casual and periodic contact with
nonpublic school administrators and little or no contact with
nonpublic school teachers when they visit the parochial
schools."' 63 The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, and
the Court dismissed appeal.""'
Deciding on the basis of the record in PEARL and supple-
mental affidavits, Judge Neaher, in the eastern district, also up-
held the program in an unreported decision."'
B. The Second Circuit
On appeal the second circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Friendly, reversed the eastern district decision.6 Judge
Friendly found defendants' contentions contrary to Supreme
Court precedents.1 67 Under Lemon, "Is the schools were perva-
sively sectarian."6 Under Meek, 170 auxiliary services, such as re-
medial education, could not be provided in nonpublic schools.17 '
Under Wolman, 1 2 such aid could be provided for nonpublic
school students only if the location of the services was not iden-
161. Id. at 1265-68.
162. Id. at 1268 (quoting Plaintiffs' Trial Memorandum of Law at 10).
163. 489 F. Supp. at 1268.
164. Appeal dissmissed sub nom. Nat'l Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty
v. Hufstedler, 449 U.S. 808, reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980).
165. Felton v. Secretary of Educ., No. 78 CV 1750 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1983).
166. Felton, 739 F.2d at 72.
167. Id. at 50-54 (recounting the facts of the program). Id. at 54-64 (discussion of
precedent leading to a finding of "constitutionally excessive entanglement of church and
state,").
168. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 84-95 and accompa-
nying text.
169. Felton, 739 F.2d at 55-56, 68-70.
170. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). See supra notes 108-15 and accompany-
ing text. Judge Friendly also relied on Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 417
U.S. 961 (1974), atf'ing mem., 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), which struck down a New
Jersey statute similar to Title I.
171. Felton, 739 F.2d at 59-61.




tified with religion. 173 Excessive entanglement would be impli-
cated by any public personnel entering "a sectarian milieu". 174
Aid must not require policing, or the state cannot be certain
that it is not aiding religion.'7
The second circuit put the burden on the government to
prove there was no potential risk, and that the schools were so
secular that no significant surveillance would be necessary.1 76
Governmental neutrality toward religion obviates even the mere
appearance of joint authority of church and state because there
is a "significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of
some."M7
C. The Companion Case
The Supreme Court accepted Aguilar for review along with
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,'18 another Title I case. In
that case, a Community Education program and a Shared Time
program funded under Title I were held to have the primary ef-
fect of supporting religious activities in violation of the estab-
lishment clause.'
Community Education teachers in nonpublic schools were
generally employees of the nonpublic school in question, hired to
teach courses outside regular school hours as part-time public
employees. 180 These courses were open to the general public, and
held in classrooms leased from nonpublic schools by the state.''
Shared Time teachers were full-time public school employ-
ees teaching in classrooms leased from nonpublic schools during
regular school hours.8 2 Shared Time courses supplemented the
state-mandated core curriculum with "remedial" and "enrich-
173. Felton, 739 F.2d at 61-62.
174. Id. at 64.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 65. The government has the burden of proving a negative, that a teacher
could not be supporting religion.
177. Id. at 67 (quoting Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 125-26). See also Abingdon
School Dist., 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
178. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985), aff'ing, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983).
179. Id. at 3230.
180. Id. at 3219.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3218-19.
[Vol. IV
1986] COMMENTS 259
ment" courses. 183 These were, as a practical matter, open only to
students of the nonpublic school in which they were held.18
During these classes the parochial school students were denomi-
nated part-time public school students."8 '
Although the Community Education program was struck
down by a 7-2 vote,1 86 the Shared Time program was invalidated
by a 5-4 vote.'87 The Shared Time program attracted the sup-
port of two additional justices, because it was not simply a sub-
terfuge through which private school teachers were paid to teach
private school classes. Shared Time was regarded as providing a
discrete public benefit, beyond advancing the mission of the reli-
gious schools.' 8
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. The Opinion of the Court and the Concurrence
The structure of the Court's review in Aguilar indicates a
return to the Lemon test, and its strict application.8 9 No chal-
lenge was made to the actual Title I statute. 90 Consequently,
the Court did not address the first prong of secular legislative
purpose in great detail.' In Grand Rapids, the Court found the
programs had the primary effect of aiding religion, thus re-af-
183. Id. at 3218-19.
184. Id. at 3220.
185. Id.
186. Justices White and Rehnquist would have upheld both programs. Id. at 3248-49
(White, J.,dissenting), and id. at 3231-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice O'Connor would have upheld only the Shared Time program. Id. at 3231
(Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting), and id. at 3232 (O'Connor, J., concurring and
dissenting).
187. Id. at 3230.
188. Id. The Court fails to show how subtle indoctrination could be in particular ten-
ets, or how overt indoctrination would be difficult to prevent. The Court also puts forth
the proposition that "any aid to religious education is aid to religion" without distin-
guishing the opposite principle in Allen, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. "We therefore reaffirm that state
action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause should be measured against the
Lemon criteria." Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223.
190. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3234-36. See also supra note 156, 138-45.
191. Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223, "[a]s has often been true in school aid cases,
there is no dispute as to the first test. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
found that the purpose of the Community Education and Shared Time programs was
'manifestly secular.'" See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1986) where the Court
re-affirmed the first prong of the Lemon test, during the same term as Aguilar.
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firming the second prong of the Lemon test.192 In Aguilar, to re-
affirm the third prong of the Lemon test, the Court assumed
that no primary effect of the program was aiding religion, 93 and
proceeded to find excessive entanglement.194
The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, s95 held
the regulations that defendants claimed would prevent teachers
from inculcating religion in violation of the establishment clause
prohibition against aiding religion,' 96 resulted in excessive en-
tanglement, a different establishment clause violation.'97 The
Court noted that the principle of nonentanglement rests on two
concerns: that governmental involvement with a sect reduces the
freedom of nonadherents to believe otherwise, and that govern-
ment involvement interferes with adherents' control over their
own sect.'95 Relying on Lemon 9 9 and Meek,20 0 and noting the
distinction between aid to institutions of higher education and
aid to elementary and secondary schools,2°' the Court found that
two elements of entanglement were present: aid was provided to
a pervasively sectarian institution, and that aid required contin-
192. See supra notes 182-88.
193. 105 S. Ct. at 3237.
194. Id. at 3239.
195. Concurred in by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
196. 105 S. Ct. at 3236-37.
197. Id. at 3239. The Court alludes to regulations controlling teacher conduct in
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620, and in Meek, 421 U.S. at 372, but the regulation in Lemon
regulated religious school employees. The difficulty of serving two masters at the same
time was the basis for the distinction in Lemon, but the regulations in Meek and Aguilar
were aimed at public employees.
Furthermore, Catholic high schools may no longer be under the control of the au-
thoritarian hierarchies with which the Court was concerned in Lemon. The author's alma
mater, Nazareth Regional High School, has been operating as a Catholic school under
the control of a community board of directors independent of the Brooklyn Diocese since
1975. See generally Nazareth Regional H.S. v. N.L.R.B., 549 F.2d 873 (1977).
198. 105 S.Ct. at 3237.
199. See supra notes 84-95.
200. See supra notes 108-15.
201. Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Board, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
This distinction has also been applied to other areas of the law, besides aid to paro-
chial school. See Catholic Bishop v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (jurisdiction over
teachers in religious, secondary schools denied). Cf. Catholic High School Ass'n v. Cul-
vert, 753 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1985) (state labor relations board had jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether dispute between teachers and religious high schools was based on religious
or secular concerns).
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uing supervision to ensure the absence of religious influence.2'
Administrative cooperation to allow the public and nonpublic
schools to work together would result in frequent contacts and a
"continuing day-to-day relationship 20 3 violating the principle of
neutrality. 204
While concurring in the majority opinion, Justice Powell
wrote a separate opinion.2°5 Powell provided the fifth vote to
strike down this aid program, in contrast to his joining a five-
member majority in Mueller to uphold an aid program.2 0 Al-
though the majority mentioned political divisiveness,20 7 Powell
emphasized this "additional risk ' 20 8 as arising especially in the
context of "the proper allocation of limited governmental
resources.'209
Justice Powell, in acknowledging the Court's discussion of
the primary effect test in Grand Rapids,2 1 0 stated that the Agui-
lar program was invalid under the primary effect prong of the
Lemon test as well as under the excessive entanglement prong.
He maintained that assistance to the religious institutions was
not "indirect or incidental. ' 21 The programs, in his view, aided
the religious mission of the parochial schools (to educate chil-
dren within the traditions of the faith) by not limiting them-
selves to "evenhanded secular assistance to both parochial and
public schools that could be administered, without governmental
supervision in the private schools, so as to prevent the diversion
of aid from secular purposes. "212
B. The Dissents
Chief Justice Burger voted to uphold the New York City
program21 3 and the Shared Time program in Grand Rapids.214
202. 105 S. Ct. at 3238.
203. Id. at 3239 (quoting Wahz, 397 U.S. at 674).
204. 105 S. Ct. at 3239.
205. Id.
206. 463 U.S. 388. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
207. 105 S. Ct. at 3239.
208. Id. at 3240.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 3241. See also text accompanying note 179.
211. 105 S. Ct. at 3241.
212. Id. at 3242.
213. Id.
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Chief Justice Burger did not believe that providing public school
teachers was an impermissible form of state aid, in contrast to
providing support for private school teachers.2" The failure of
the majority "to identify any threat to religious liberty,"2 ' indi-
cated to Chief Justice Burger that the majority's decision was
based on "nothing less than hostility toward religion and the
children who attend church-sponsored schools."21
Justice Rehnquist referred to his dissent in Wallace v. Jaf-
free,2"' a school prayer case in which he re-examined the origin
and intent of the religion clauses.21 9 He called for the formula-
tion of a workable test which would not sharply divide the Court
on narrow questions nor lead to plurality decisions on important
issues.2 0 Justice Rehnquist voted to uphold the New York City
program as "nondiscriminatory nonsectarian aid,"2 "which ob-
214. Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3231.
215. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3242. Burger does not give an explanation for his distinc-
tion betweeen the programs in Grand Rapids, 105. S. Ct. at 3231, but he apparently
agrees with Justice O'Connor's analysis of the Grand Rapids programs. Both would up-
hold the program paying public school employees to teach in parochial schools, but
would invalidate the program paying parochial school teachers to teach extra classes
outside regular school hours. Title I requires programs to supplement, not supplant, ex-
isting opportunities. Expanding curricula with enrichment or remedial classes supplants
the normal classes those children would have attended. On the other hand, paying paro-
chial school teachers to teach extra classes as in the Community Education programs, or
tutoring individual students instead of entire classes supplements educational opportuni-
ties without merely replacing services the parochial school was already providing.
Justice Brennan's consideration of the supplement/supplant distinction arrived at
the conclusion that it "would permit the public schools gradually to take over the entire
secular curriculum of the religious school, for the latter could surely discontinue existing
courses so that they might be replaced a year or two later by a Community Education or
Shared Time course with the same content." Id. at 3230.
The distinction made in the statute between supplementing and supplanting has
been ignored by the Court. The original distinction was intended to limit federal involve-
ment in local affairs, and would similarly have limited governmental involvement in reli-
gious affairs.
216. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3242.
217. Id. at 3242-43.
218. 105 S. Ct. 2479.
219. Id. at 2508.
220. Id. at 2516 n.6, and at 2518. See also supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text
for Wolman and Meek. The swing from Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Mueller, see
supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text, to Justice Brennan's opinions in Grand
Rapids and Aguilar, see supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text, was made possible
by Justice Powell's switch, see supra note 206. Surely, Powell did not change his view as
completely between Mueller and Aguilar as the Court's opinions suggest.
221. 105 S. Ct. at 3243.
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viously meets an entirely sectarian need." '2 22
Like Chief Justice Burger, Justice O'Connor voted to up-
hold the New York City program2 3 and the Grand Rapids
Shared Time program.2 4 Justice O'Connor attacked the major-
ity's reliance on the conclusion in Meek 225 "that public school
teachers who set foot on parochial school premises are likely to
bring religion into their classes, and that the supervision neces-
sary to prevent religious teaching would unduly entangle church
and state. '2  Although she joined in condemning the Commu-
nity Education program for subsidizing religious schools,227 Jus-
tice O'Connor found that, based on its nineteen-year history, the
New York City program did not have the effect of advancing
religion. 228 Teachers are able to resist a sectarian atmosphere.
The plaintiffs' should have the burden of showing religious influ-
ence, rather than requiring the defendants to prove the lack of
religious influence. 229 The setting of a remedial class is the dis-
tinction that the Court employed in Wolman,23 0 but it is difficult
to prove that the religious setting has an effect on the teachers
or students. " '
Turning to the excessive entanglement prong, Justice
O'Connor rejected Meek. As a precedent it lacked "logical sup-
port,"12 32 and it contradicted the facts, which show no proselytiz-
ing by Title I teachers.2 3 She maintained that supervision of
public school teachers need not increase just because they are
sent to different locations.3 Justice O'Connor also found that
neither the administrative entanglement nor the political divi-
siveness grounds were supported by the facts.235
Justice White filed a cursory dissent referring to his dissents
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 105 S. Ct. at 3231.
225. 421 U.S. 349, 367-73. See also supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
226. 105 S. Ct. at 3243.
227. 105 S. Ct. at 3231.
228. 105 S. Ct. at 3245.
229. Id. at 3245.
230. 433 U.S. 229, 244-48. See also supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
231. 105 S. Ct. 3245-46.
232. Id. at 3246.
233. Id.




in Lemon and Nyquist.23 6 In Lemon,2"7 Justice White urged the
Court to consider the p6licies behind the various positions,
rather than to mandate an outcome viscerally.2 8 Education pro-
vided by religious schools may be aided by the state in Justice
White's view, because it is a "separable secular function of over-
riding importance,"2' 9 and the benefit to religious institutions is
incidental.24 0 Where the state obligates itself to educate, it
should be free to support the secular education of those children
whose parents choose to provide them with both religious and
secular education.2  Social institutions and forces are entangled
to some degree, and state surveillance may accompany even a
one-time grant in order to determine the effectiveness of such
grants to plan future programs.24 2 Justice White's view on aid to
religious schools may best be summarized by his statement in
Nyquist: "[a] state should put no unnecessary obstacles in the
way of religious training for the young. "243
IV. CONCLUSION
In deciding Aguilar, the Court limited its decision to the
particular program being challenged.4 It failed to address the
fact that no particular religious institution was being aided. The
aid flowed directly to students. Religious schools participated
only to identify eligible students, and to provide a room for
tutoring. 2"' These schools were already responsible for the edu-
236. Id. at 3247. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 661, and Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756. White's
opinion applies to both Grand Rapids and Aguilar, and is printed at the end of the cases
out of order of seniority and under a unified case heading, set off from the other opin-
ions, symbolizing his isolation and unique point of view.
237. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 661.
238. Id. at 662.
239. Id. at 664.
240. Id. See also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 823-24.
241. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 814-15. See also Pierce, supra note 49.
242. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 669, "[s]urely the notion that college students are more ma-
ture and resistant to indoctrination is a makeweight, for in Tilton, there is careful note
of the federal conditions on funding and the enforcement mechanism available." Id. at
668.
243. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 814.
244. See supra note 190 and accompanying text, and notes 138-49 and accompanying
text.
245. Felton, 739 F.2d at 53. Cf. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. 2d at 3235 ("The professional




cation of these students under compulsory attendance laws, and
already had these students under their physical control.""6
In Lemon, the government could not subsidize the salaries
of parochial school teachers." 7 In Meek, public school teachers
could not be sent to parochial schools. 248 Although the Court ad-
dressed and dismissed the distinction between parochial and
public school teachers at that point, it did not explain it.249 The
second circuit, in the present case, also noted the distinction and
failed to explain it.2 50 The Court then relied on the weight of
this unexplained precedent.251 In each case, Lemon, Meek, Wol-
man, and Aguilar, the relationship of the aid to the parochial
school has diminished, but the aid is still not permitted. Some
aid is permissible, but the distinction between permissible and
impermissible aid is not restated or re-examined. 52
The Court essentially relies on the tautological statements
246. N.Y. EDUc. LAW §§ 3201-43 (McKINNEY'S 1981 & SuPP. 1986).
247. 403 U.S. at 607.
248. 421 U.S. at 367.
249. The fact that the teachers and counselors providing the auxiliary services
are employees of the public intermediate unit, rather than of the church-related
schools in which they work, does not eliminate the need for continuing surveil-
lance. To be sure, auxiliary-service personnel, because not employed by the non-
public schools, are not directly subject to the discipline of a religious authority
... . But they are performing important educational services in schools in
which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in
which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is con-
stantly maintained . . . . The potential for impermissible fostering of religion
under these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present.
To be certain that auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral, as the Constitu-
tion demands, the State would have to impose limitations on the activities of
auxiliary personnel and then engage in some form of continuing surveillance to
ensure that those restrictions were being followed.
421 U.S. at 371-72 (citations omitted).
250. We cannot escape the conviction that, despite the attempted distinctions,
appellees are really asking us to say that Meek was wrongly decided -that the
majority, although expressly addressing the issue. . . did not adequately appre-
ciate the difference between surveillance of religious school teachers condemned
in Lemon and the surveillance of public school teachers in religious schools con-
demned in Meek. Whatever the merits of that argument may or may not be, we
are nevertheless bound by the Meek decision.
739 F.2d at 72 (citations omitted).
251. "[B]ecause assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing inspection is
required to ensure the absence of a religious message." 105 S. Ct. at 3238.
252. Basically the Court refuses to recognize that whatever can be said about public
school teachers who enter private premises, can also be said about public school teachers
on public premises. See supra note 27.
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that religious schools are religious, and public schools are not
religious or anti-religious. The location where aid is provided
distinguishes between permissible and impermissible pro-
grams.8 Justice Powell, as the fifth vote of the majority, has
apparently led the majority to announce its decision in terms of
the nature of teaching relationships. 4 That relationship, how-
ever, is only explored in theory. " ' The Court finds that teachers,
no matter how hard they try not to do so, will inculcate religion
in a location identified with religion. " In other cases, Justice
Powell has been amenable to exploring the actual facts of the
case, rather than relying solely on location as a determining fac-
tor. Precedent guides Justice Powell's decision that teachers are
an impermissible form of aid. On the other hand, no precedent
dictated a result regarding municipal creches or education tax
credits.25 7
Entanglement analysis is itself a fabrication of the Court
which is not mandated by the Constitution. This analysis is not
a tool for processing raw facts, but a replacement for those facts.
The Court disposes of defendants' claims as insufficiently cer-
tain for constitutional purposes, and relies instead on facts
drawn from thin air. The particular interactions of the parties,
however, is the focus of entanglement analysis. The preferable
form of contact between the separate bureaucracies would be oc-
casional and limited. 58 Administrative contact will be increased
by the greater need for setting schedules for transportation of
students. Except for location, teacher-student contact will re-
main the same.
In order to keep its Title I funding for public school stu-
dents, New York City will be forced to find alternative sites for
253. This distinction was first developed in McCollum and Zorach, see supra notes
63-72 and accompanying text.
254. Powell's concurrence reiterates the majority opinion to such an extent it is diffi-
cult to understand why he writes separately. But see supra Powell's opinion in Wolman,
433 U.S. at 262-64, where he would have upheld bus transportation as a form of aid,
because as a category of aid, buses were upheld in Everson.
255. Plaintiffs were spared the expense and difficulty of proving an actual violation of
the establishment clause at trial. Felton, 739 F.2d at 52. See also Hitchcock, supra note,
157.
256. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. 2d at 3239.
257. See Meek and Wolman, supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text. Cf. Marsh
and Lynch, supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
258. See Walz supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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tutoring parochial school students, to spend money for transpor-
tation in some cases, and even to purchase vans for use as mo-
bile classrooms.2 5' The involvement of the state in the education
of these children will become much greater. The affected stu-
dents will be made aware of the existence of separate spheres of
church and state, although at the cost of the possibility of psy-
chological impressions of religious dependence or inferiority. 60
Children in need of tutoring will not be aided by this layer of
constitutional protection. Tutors will have less contact with the
students' regular teachers, and may have difficulty getting stu-
dents to concentrate in unfamiliar surroundings. The taxpayers
bringing this suit will not save any money, and the public
schools may lose resources as education money is consumed by
increased administrative costs. 2 61 The Court understands educa-
tion and religion in its own way.2 62 Each justice decides on the
basis of his own preconceptions, and in this area there is no con-
sensus on which theory to apply to the facts.263 The doctrine of
entanglement does not provide a framework through which facts
can be analyzed at present, but is merely a means for the jus-
tices to express their personal views. However painstaking their
analysis, the justices can express no better rationale for striking
down the program than the legislators and educators who imple-
mented it could express for providing it.26
259. See Felton, 739 F.2d at 51, stating that a study done in 1977-78 indicated trans-
porting parochial school students to public schools would require $4.2 million, or 42% of
the city's Title I budget. See also N.Y. Times, April 22, 1986, at B1, col. 4: the City is
planning to spend $7 million dollars on 70 custom-built vans to be used as classrooms
outside parochial schools. Only 15%'P of the parochial school students would use the vans,
the remainder being taught at nearby public schools or other neutral sites. See also Fel-
ton v. Secretary of Educ., 787 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986), affirming the district court's grant
of a one-year stay of enforcement of the Supreme Court's decision.
260. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, for the converse prohibition of psy-
chological affiliation or identification.
261. See supra notes 150 and 253.
262. "[Plublic school teachers may be regarded as performing a task 'that go[es] to
the heart of representative government.' " Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1979)
(quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
263. Mueller, Religious Rights of Children: A Gallery of Judicial Visions, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. OF L. & Soc. CHANGE 323 (1986) which delineates four models for deciding cases
involving the religious rights of children.
264. Some cases have claimed equal protection grounds for maintaining aid to paro-
chial school students, and some programs have separate provisions for programs for pub-
lic and private schools students. Separability provisions would maintain benefits for pub-
lic school students when programs for parochial school students would be struck down as
1986]
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Education can serve political or religious ends, but it pro-
vides a distinct social benefit not connected to religion or polit-
ics. 26 5 Where schools serve religion or politics to the exclusion of
education, the emphasis should return to education. Before the
Court denies children the opportunity to learn, it should con-
sider their concrete needs and the reality of the classroom, and
not possible abstractions.
Sean P. Sullivan
unconstitutional. The provision of equal benefits would not be defended by the equal
protection clause, even though the programs were passed as a unit and religious differ-
ences were the only reason for one part being struck down.
265. Some children are sent to religious schools for education rather than religious
education. See Schotten, supra note 43, for reasons besides religion for which parents
would incur the expense of sending their children to parochial schools, (acceptance of
racial minorities in the face of white flight; emphasis on discipline and order in a time of
increasing school violence and vandalism; ability to maintain academic standards; and
assimilation of racial minorities).
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